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Abstract 
This research aims to examine inter-organizational cooperation and its network during emergency response of West 
Java Earthquake 2009, in Indonesia. In order to do so, the concepts from social network analysis will be used to 
examine and reveal the pattern of the network. In addition to the several social network measurements, qualitative 
finding and analytical results will be contrasted with the current institutional arrangement to improve cooperation at 
the time of emergency response. While, the network identified is similar to the most effective inter-organizational 
cooperation pattern predicted, as a result, the humanitarian aids delivery performance in this earthquake was 
somewhat under-performed. Therefore, internal capacity building of disaster-related agencies and network 
formulation prior the disaster is still needed for better humanitarian aids delivery at the time of disaster.  
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
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1. Introduction 
Natural disaster is one of the most pressing threats to the security of human-being. Human security 
concept basically placed any threat towards human as a concern that should be addressed promptly. 
According to Ogata and Sen [1]  lives in 
Government classify human security as a freedom from fear and freedom from wants; i.e. one of 
recognized threats is the natural disaster and environmental problems. Given the consciousness of disaster 
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, by the time of disaster, many development actors are willing to offer 
humanitarian or emergency support. However, ensuring effectiveness of humanitarian support goes far 
beyond awareness and commitment to human security, it requires systematic institutional arrangement.  
Coppola [2] noted, the common view is that the responsibility for managing disaster ultimately rests 
with the local and national governments of the country that is being affected by disaster. However, 
government is not the only actor to manage disaster; recent studies and publications suggest that the 
words partnership, cooperation, collaboration and so forth as essential terminologies for disaster 
management [3, 4, 5, 6] stated, in the 21st century, complex problems such as disaster have emerged 
proliferating collaborative effort using available resources. Coppola (2008) also strongly suggests that at 
some point government assistance in for disaster would leave off and lead to the necessity of multilateral 
and nongovernmental organizations. By far, there are only small number of studies that concerns on 
institutional arrangement, especially inter-organizational cooperation and the of use social network, 
within disaster management field in Indonesia.  
Therefore, by using the West Java Earthquake 2009 as a case study, this paper aims to explore inter-
organizational cooperation practice during emergency situation. The West Java earthquake itself 
happened on 2 September 2009, the province hit an earthquake measured 7.3 on the Richter scale. As it 
suggested by Humanitarian Index Report [7], after the events of West Java Earthquake 2009, there are 
still much room for learning and improvement in terms of coordination and investment, both in 
emergency response and preparedness.  
There are three research questions being answered in this paper; i.e. (1) In what ways inter-
organizational cooperation creates network at emergency response of West Java Earthquake 2009?; (2) 
How was the character of the network at the emergency response of West Java Earthquake 2009?; and (3) 
To what extent lessons learned from the network from the case can improve institutional arrangement and 
governance of disaster management?  
2. Methodology: Social Network for Analyzing Inter-Organizational Cooperation 
This research is conducted with mixture of quantitative and qualitative approach. Inter-organizational 
cooperation as object of this study is will be studied using Social Network Analysis (SNA) approach. The 
SNA basically rooted at the intersection of organization and network theory. In short, SNA is the study of 
the structural relationships among interacting network members  individual, organizations, etc.  and of 
how those relationships produce varying effects; with its fundamental property of SNA are ability to 
determine, through mathematical algorithms, whether network members are connected and to what 
degree  to one another in various relationships [8]. It produce a graph and matrix of social network; i.e. a 
set of relations that apply to a set of actors as well as any additional information on those actors and 
relations [9]. The SNA was performed to analyze the complete network structure (sociometric level), i.e. 
the measurement of degree centrality, betweeness centrality, closeness centrality, density, and 
identification. To comprehend the SNA measurement, qualitative research manner was also conducted to 
provide insight of the network analysis. 
There are two mainstreams in network analysis which is common in social and political researches; 
i.e. network-as-structure and network-as-actors [10]. The first approach embraces a broad definition of 
networks, concentrates on their structural characteristics and assesses the effects of network structure. 
Having said that, this approach try to identify the relational structure within the network or emergent 
attributes of the network systematically influence the actions of its nodes (members of network) and 
produce identifiable outcome.  In relation to the outcome, the ties or links among the nodes create a 
structure (a persistent pattern of relations) that in turn serves to constrain actors or provide opportunities 
for action [11, 12]. Viewed as structure, networks are not the result of conscious design on the part of the 
agents, even though they sustained by interaction on the part of the nodes. An individual node (state, 
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individual, organization, or other agent) confronts the networks as a structural given, its behaviour 
constrained by network ties. 
On the other hand, the second mainstream discriminates between networks and other modes of 
organization, evaluating network success or failure in achieving collective ends. In this mainstream, a 
ing exchange relations with one another, 
and at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve dispute that may 
arise during exchange [13]. This second mainstream is more appropriate in comparing whether particular 
collective goal fits for market, hierarchy, or network arrangement within organization theory. Between 
those two mainstreams, this research is more leaning to the first one. 
This approach, using SNA, has been known of its versatility for many research occasions; e.g. how 
community/organizational networks form and grow [14], how network governance influences policy [15], 
how crises cause change in social networks (Varda et al: 2009). As an approach basically social network 
has been being used for various context and level of research, for instance from individual level [16], 
community [17], as well as organizational context [18]. 
Specifically in relation to this research, there are several past researches which employ network theory 
to study inter-organizational cooperation at the time of disaster. For example from United States, (2009) 
gave broader view of aid and emergency response following the Hurricane Katrina and by employing full 
quantitative SNA techniques he successfully persuade further investment for State Government because 
they proved to be the key actors. Similarly, University of Illinois Urbana Champaign and University of 
California at Irvine also studied the emergent of multi-organizational networks in the response to 
Hurricane Katrina, by comparing results from manual and computed social network analysis; thus able to 
inter-organizational links. However, both studies have little contribution to the greater discourse on how 
to improve global cooperation arrangement for humanitarian efforts at the time of disaster, since primarily 
cooperation with local actors which commonly occurs in developing countries at the time of disaster or 
any other humanitarian crises. 
As for Indonesian context, by far, there is still very limited research which utilized network theory for 
policy making in disaster realm. However, at least two studies can be obtained in regards to this topic. 
The first came from Mahendraputra [19] who used network approach to find out entry point in doing 
social structure intervention for disaster risk reduction in Bengawan Solo watershed which prone to flood. 
However, the measurement is being conducted at community level, analyzed only local actors and there 
was no greater contribution on how cooperation of humanitarian efforts should be readdressed. The 
second one is Lassa (2010) which look deeper to the disaster institutions issue. In his works, SNA used to 
see relation among institutional feature in disaster risk management for Indonesian level. On other 
section, it also explains which actor is the most central in Indonesian disaster risk management. However, 
this work only concern on using social network approach at the nation-wide level and have little 
applicability for other humanitarian efforts cooperation in other countries. 
Previous work which is comparable with this research comes from Gillmann [20], which use the case 
of Darfur Crisis and Aceh Tsunami 2004 and thus proposed four typology of cooperation in delivering 
humanitarian efforts (Figure 1). Among that typology, based on findings from experiences of 
humanitarian efforts in both cases, lead-agency network claimed as the best pattern for inter-
organizational cooperation at the time of disaster, to meet the standard performance of humanitarian 
efforts. The preposition of the typology is very important and, as Gillmann herself suggested, needs to be 
tested in other cases. However, even though this work is also originated from the network theory, the 
research was fully-qualitative and only incorporates global humanitarian actors, e.g. the United Nations 
agencies, organizations belong to red-cross movement, and major Non-Government Organizations 
(NGOs).  approach was lacking in incorporating local NGOs and other local actors which in 
reality also participate in the humanitarian efforts in both cases.  
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Given the review above, this research, to some extent, also test the conceptual typology of cooperation 
for humanitarian efforts proposed by Gillmann (2009) under a larger dataset (number) of actors and 
networks. In that sense, SNA is the most appropriate tool to breakdown the pattern of network with 
quantitative measurement without leaving the depth that may be provided by qualitative approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1. Typology for Cooperation of Humanitarian Efforts at the Time of Disaster (Gilmann, 2009:193) 
3. Case Study and Analysis 
3.1 West Java Earthquake 2009  
West Java Earthquake occurred on Wednesday, 2 September 2009 at 14:55 local time. Based on the 
BMKG, the earthquake epicentre was located 142 km southwest of Tasikmalaya, at a depth 30 km below 
sea level. While the USGS has recorded that the earthquake magnitude was 7.4 SR at a depth of 60 km 
below sea level. Effects of the earthquake were also felt in Bandung City (144 km from the epicentre), 
Sukabumi Regency (156 km from epicentre), Jakarta City (242 km from epicentre) and other cities in 
West Java, Yogyakarta and Central Java Provinces. This earthquake occurred due to the subduction of 
plates between Indo-Australian plate and the Eurasian plate, which is located in the southern part of Java 
Island. The epicentre of this earthquake can be seen in the following figure. 
This earthquake affected 15 regencies/cities in West Java Province and Cilacap Regency in Central 
Java Province. Based on data published by West Java Task Force on Disaster (Satkorlak PB) and National 
Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), as of 25 September 2009, the number victims of the earthquake 
covered 81 people death, 1,917 people seriously injured, and 50,964 households or 196,107 persons being 
displaced.  
The greatest number of casualties was in Cianjur Regency due to landslides triggered by the 
earthquake. This research itself only focused on inter-organizational cooperation in delivering 
humanitarian aids in five selected regencies; i.e. Bandung, Cianjur, Garut, Ciamis, and Tasikmalaya 
Regency. The level of damage and the highest number of victims in orderly manner was in Bandung 
Regency, Garut Regency, and Tasikmalaya Regency. The need of post disaster rehabilitation and 
893 Mizan B. F. Bisri /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  17 ( 2013 )  889 – 898 
reconstruction funding reached 3.7 trillion Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), consists of the funding for 
government asset damage 804 billion rupiah (21.6%) and for non government asset reconstruction 2.9 
trillion IDR (78.4%).  
Based on the West Java and Central Java Post-Disaster Damage and Loss Assessment done by 
National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), BNPB, local government and international partners, 
the damage and loss was predicted to reach 7,899 trillion IDR, where 89,79% was non-government asset 
and 10,21% was government asset. The earthquake caused damage and loss particularly to housing, 
infrastructure, social, and productive economy sectors, as well as to cross-sectoral, e.g. government 
buildings. Bandung Regency had the worst damage and loss compared to other regencies, due to its high 
damage and loss in the economic and housing sectors. Most damage and loss from the social sector 
happened in Tasikmalaya Regency, followed by Garut Regency. Damage and loss from the infrastructure 
sector happened only in Tasikmalaya Regency, mostly in the education sub-sector, where 5,410 school 
rooms damaged. The worst cross-sectoral damage and loss happened in Ciamis Regency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Epicenter of West Java Earthquake 2009 (Source: Modified from Bappenas, 2009) 
 
Overall, the worst damage and loss were in the housing sector, as much as 6.97 trillion IDR (88,22%), 
followed by social sectors 755 billion IDR (9,56%), and cross-sectoral 156.21 billion IDR (1,98%); 
Economically, the earthquake caused temporary business discontinuity among public regarding the 
damage of market, stalls, and middle to lower industries, thus increased number of poor people. 
During emergency response and early recovery of West Java Earthquake 2009, 232 activities were 
identified (173 executed in a cooperative manner), in which took place from 2  16 September 2009. The 
activities are being classified into eight groups, as follows: 47 activities of Food Distribution (FD), 88 
activities of Non-Food Item distribution (NFI), 48 activities of Health Service (HS), 34 activities of Rapid 
Assessment (RA), 19 activities of Search and Rescue (SAR), 47 activities of Cash and Donation (CD), 4 
activities of Water and Sanitation (WS), and 22 others activities. Those activities were being performed 
by 187 identified organizations; the distribution of actors is given in Figure 3(b). 
Non Food Items distribution dominated the activities during Emergency Response of West Java 
Earthquake 2009 as shown in the following figure. Non Food Item distribution includes blanket, tent, 
mats, etc. There were less number of activities related to water and sanitation (1.3%). In emergency 
response, the number of activities conducted with cooperation was less than that of pre-disaster phase. 
tivity from the service provider to beneficiaries, 
such as cash and donation activities. Most emergency response activities were conducted in Cianjur 
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Regency (24%). This regency suffered from landslide due to the earthquake, and thus as found in the 
BPBD Cianjur reports, there were many emergency response activities held in Cianjur, including search 
and rescue of landslide victims and receiving donation from various parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3. (a) Distribution of Activities, (b) Distributions of Actors, in Emergency Response of West Java Earthquake 2009 
 
3.2 Social Network Analysis Measurement during the Emergency Response of West Java Earthquake 
Measurement of social network analysis in emergency response phase has been conducted based on 
dataset comprises of 173 sample of activities that indicates cooperation. From the dataset, position of 
implementing actors, partners, and organizations that acted as beneficiaries; thus become input for the 
sociomatrix. As an initial stage, author  
value will be given 
of social-network graph at the end of West Java emergency response phase (16 September 2009) is given 
in the figure below, while in the detail analysis daily growth of network was considered. Thus, output of 
the sociomatrix was exported to the UCINET software for its calculations. The measurement consists of 
the following: degree of centrality, betweeness, closeness, density of network, and  identification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Social-  
Afterwards, several statistical measurements performed to analyze the characteristic of actors within 
the network. The result of degree centrality and betweeness centrality measurement are  displayed on 
Table 1. it can be seen that the top-ten of actors with highest centrality are Satkorlak West Java, BPBD 
Cianjur Regency (local government), BNPB, UN-OCHA, Dinkes West Java (Health Agency), Jabar 
Peduli (local NGO), PMI (Indonesian Red Cross), Kemenkes (Indonesian Ministry of Health), UNICEF, 
and Oxfam. In sum, the top-ten consists of two central government agencies, two provincial agencies, one 
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regency agency, two UN agencies, two local NGOs, and one international NGO. 
Table 1. Degree Centrality and Betweeness Centrality of  Network in West Java Earthquake 2009 Emergency Response 
DEGREE CENTRALITY BETWEENESS CENTRALITY 
Rank Organization Degree NrmDegree Rank  Organization Betweeness nBetweeness 
1 Satkorlak West Java 124.000 70.455 1 Satkorlak West Java 19713.365 64.740 
2 BPBD Cianjur 33.000 18.750 2 BPBD Cianjur 4261.347 13.995 
3 BNPB 22.000 12.500 3 Dinkes West Java 1839.499 6.041 
4 UN OCHA 21.000 11.932 4 Kemenkes 1093.181   3.590 
5 Dinkes West Java 21.000 11.932 5 BNPB 1032.241 3.390 
6 Jabar Peduli 15.000 8.523 6 Oxfam 896.543 2.944 
7 PMI 15.000 8.523 7 UN OCHA 760.539 2.498 
8 Kemenkes  13.000 7.386 8 PMI 605.326 1.988 
9 Unicef 12.000 6.818 9 ITB 527.767 1.733 
10 Oxfam 10.000 5.682 10 Jabar Peduli 497.269 1.633 
 
Based on the degree centrality, it seems that the network very centralized to Satkorlak West Java (an 
ad-hoc organization for emergency response) with its degree reached 70.455. However, this value 
probably over estimated since the ties are sum up of all types of cooperation, resources sharing, 
knowledge exchange, etc. It should be noted that by the time of earthquake, West Java Province have not 
founded their BPBD (Local Disaster Management Agency) which actually mandated by the Law 
24/2007. Therefore, most of the resources flowed to the Satkorlak West Java which works under the 
Secretariat of West Java Province and consists of representatives of many related agencies, thus this also 
one of the reason of its high value of degree centrality. Similarly, degree centrality of BPBD Cianjur 
reached 18.750 is almost dominated by cooperation in terms of transferring cash donation, although other 
emergency response activities also conducted by and through BPBD Cianjur.  
As a national agency, BNPB thus ranked third in terms of degree centrality, in which most of the 
works are to supervise the West Java Provincial Government, mostly Satkorlak West Java, since the 
province did not have BPBD. Afterwards, UN OCHA ranked fourth in terms of centrality due to its 
network towards INGOs and local NGOs that their preparations for facing disaster situation have already 
being done beforehand. Dinkes West Java (Health Agency) also has degree centrality same as the UN 
OCHA since the agency mostly bridges the Kemenkes and other Dinkes (Health Agency) at regency 
level, especially in terms of health support and services. 
Satkorlak West Java also ranked the highest in terms of betweenness centrality due to its role as 
bridging agency, in which all actors (governmental and non-governmental) before conducting their 
emergency response activity should contact, gain permit, and work under the supervision of Satkorlak 
West Java. Similarly, BPBD Cianjur also gained high betweenness centrality due to their involvement as 
middle-agency in cash transfer donation. Higher betweenness centrality also gained by Kemenkes and 
Dinkes West Java due to their central role in health services and support. 
Up to this stage, it seems that the network analysis suggests that the interaction of cooperation between 
187 organizations during emergency response of West Java formed a network which closes to the Lead-
Agency type, since a very high degree of centrality and betweenness can be gained by a single agency. 
This type of cooperation is predicted to perform best in delivering humanitarian efforts at the time of 
disaster. However, the question then rose further in regards to the performance of network. 
The next network measurement is the closeness centrality which basically measure whether distance 
among actors is quite close or far. In the sense that closeness is also indicates intensity of information 
sharing as well as cooperation among them. From the Table 2 below, it can be seen that the mean value of 
inFarness and outFarness are the same, i.e. 7503.864. The value is basically more or less close with the 
minimum value of inFarness, i.e. 4211.000; thus it indicates that basically the network among actors 
before the West Java Earthquake 2009 is quite far without any intensive relationships among them. 
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Furthermore, comparing the mean of Farness and Closeness value already suggests that there is 
significant distance among actors within the network; i.e. 7503.864 inFarness and 10.731 inCloseness as 
well as 7503.864 inFarness and 2.509 outCloseness. In addition, the network analysis measurement also 
indicates that the graphs is unconnected, thus the network centralization is not computed. 
Table 2. Closeness Centrality during Emergency Response of West Java Earthquake 2009  
 inFarness outFarness inCloseness outCloseness 
Mean 7503.864 7503.864 10.731 2.509 
Standard Deviation 12009.752 3984.394 5.296 0.333 
Sum 1320680 1320680 1888.625 441.517 
Variance 144234144 15875395 28.049 0.111 
SSQ 35295412224.000 12704272384.000 25203.168 1127.145 
MCSSQ 25385209856.000 2794069504.000 4936.659 19.548 
Euc Norm 187870.734 112713.227 158.755 33.573 
Minimum 1098 6481 0.568 0.568 
Maximum 30800 30800 15.938 2.7 
Network centralization not computed for unconnected graphs 
 
The result of network analysis also measured that the density value is 0.0184; i.e. drawn from 568 ties 
that created within actors. Such value is very small, which indicates that the actual ties among actors is 
very limited compare to the probable ties that suppose may be happened if cooperation among actors is 
conducted optimally. The small number of density also happened due to the large number of actors works 
during emergency response phase. 
The next measureme
actors that used to works together regularly. In this analysis, the number of actors that delineate the clique 
is important, in which for the context of emergency response in West Java the optimum number of actor 
are four organizations. Based on this limitation, there are 14 cliques being identified, as follows: 
Table 3. Cliques Identification Results 
No Organizations Involved in Clique No Organizations Involved in Clique 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
BNPB-CRS-Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA 
BNPB-Hope Worldwide-Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA 
BNPB-Oxfam-Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA 
BNPB-Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-World Vision 
Plan Int'l-Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-Unicef 
Satkorlak West Java-STC-UN OCHA-Unicef 
Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-UNDP-UNDSS 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-UNDP-UNFPA 
Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-UNDP-WFP 
Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-UNDP-World Bank 
CRS-Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-Unicef 
Satkorlak West Java-UN OCHA-Unicef-WFP 
BNPB-ITB-Satkorlak West Java-World Vision 
CRS-PMI-Satkorlak West Java-Unicef 
 
As it can be seen from the table above, BNPB, Satkorlak West Java, and UN OCHA is being 
mentioned several times in several cliques. Satkorlak West Java and UN OCHA is mentioned together 
several times; this due their similar role as coordinating agencies. Some UN agencies also identified 
working together, especially with UN OCHA and UNDP. The majority of cliques that comprises of 
Satkorlak West Java and UN OCHA also proved that in the end, the arrangement developed according to 
the Indonesian Inter  Agency Contingency Plan, regardless the delay caused by the lack of capacity. 
 
3.3 Performance of Network in Emergency Response of West Java Earthquake 
On the 2nd September 2009 evening, the Governor of West Java declared Emergency Response Status 
under Governor Decree SK 360/kep.1260-Hukham/2009, the response phase is set until two weeks after 
the earthquake, until 16 September 2009. There are several priorities within this phase, as follows: 
1) Organizing disaster relief, 2) Conduct a study and rapid assessment for disaster impact, victims search 
and rescue, 3) Conduct rescue and evacuation, 4) Fulfilment of basic needs, 5) Protection of vulnerable 
groups, and 6) Restoration of immediate infrastructure and facilities. Until the five days after the 
earthquake, the provincial government was still unwilling to share the collaborative effort with other 
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humanitarian actors to deliver emergency response goods and services. The government from insists, 
under the assumption of distance proximity between the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, and the West Java 
as a reason that emergency response can be handle only between joint-efforts from central, provincial, 
and local government. The government views the earthquake as the time to show towards the 
international community that Indonesia can single-handedly manage emergency response. As the view 
from UN-OCHA and DARA (2010), Indonesian Government seems keen to demonstrate that five years 
after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, they  are able to respond efficient and effectively for emergency. 
However, by the time has passed by shortage of man-power, organizational capacity, infrastructures, 
and financial support saw slow progress on emergency response. The first point is that the emergency 
response was coordinated under Satkorlak West Java which this type of organization should already being 
replaced by Local Disaster Management Agency (BPBD of West Java). As consequence, simply the 
Satkorlak, even though linked to other local actors, cannot optimize the emergency response efforts; e.g. 
lacking in publication of emergency response status, slow distribution of aids, late initiation of damage 
assessment, etc; even the BPBD Cianjur performed better than its provincial counterparts. Another factor 
that over-looked by the government was the fact that weeks of national holiday is the time-setting of the 
emergency response phase, thus the capacity to respond is lower than the initial expectation. 
The priority to conduct a study and rapid assessment for disaster impact after the earthquake is a total 
failure under the coordination of Satkorlak West Java, not to mention the indication of falsification and 
mark-up on the damage in order to gain higher financial support for recovery. Up to September 17th 2009, 
there was no available comprehensive Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA) Report of West Java 
Earthquake. Satkorlak West Java also undermine the rapid assessment conducted by UN Joint 
Assessment team consisted of UNDP, WFP, UN-OCHA, World Bank, UNICEF and UNDSS which 
already available since 3 September 2009, one day after the earthquake. Given this condition, BNPB in 
the end formulated a joint-team for official DALA effort for assessing the damage of the earthquake, the 
team consisted of Bappenas, BNPB, ITB, IPB, UNPD, and under the support of the World Bank. BNPB 
also invited UN-OCHA to support Satkorlak West Java in coordinating local and international NGOs for 
distributing aids and life support for the victims and IDPs (internally displaced people). 
One of the main features of West Java Earthquake is that the number of death casualties was not so 
big, but it was the IDPs that became the main issue. The large number of IDPs means camp and 
temporary-shelter management supposed to be the backbone of emergency response efforts. Among five 
of the affected regencies, only Cianjur and Ciamis Regency, performed better to support IDPs. The 
explanation for this condition was that both of the regencies already have their own BPBD and also the 
pre-existence of INGOs which involved in the recovery of past disaster (Pangandaran Tsunami 2006). 
After UN-OCHA get involved in supporting Satkorlak West Java under coordination with BNPB, thus 
the network with broader humanitarian actors activated under cluster arrangement. Four clusters that were 
much contributed are shelter, education, water-sanitation, and early recovery network) operated through 
coordination in UN OCHA; UNICEF leading the education and water-sanitation cluster, IFRC is leading 
the shelter cluster, and UNDP is leading the early recovery network. In addition, UN OCHA routinely 
convened UN-NGO-Donor Coordination Meeting for emergency response of the earthquake. Thus, UN 
OCHA also published Situation Report on the earthquake, so that many organizations can easily 
monitored and decide which kind of support to be given. UN OCHA in Indonesia has developed a 
mechanism so called Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) as one of the tool for coordination. The HRF 
for Indonesia is a funding mechanism for NGOs, aiming at providing immediate disbursed funds to 
assume short term humanitarian activities in Indonesia, particularly in areas where funding gaps exist. An 
external evaluation conducted in 2010 resulted that NGOs found the HRF a very useful mechanism, 
because of its flexibility.  Despite its short timeframe of maximum six months, HRF is useful to finance 
prevention and recovery activities. 
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4. Conclusion 
To this end, the paper has presented the quantitative and qualitative side of inter-organizational 
network during the emergency response of West Java Earthquake 2009. In terms of the network-sense, 
the result showed that the network of inter-organizational cooperation during the emergency response of 
West Java Earthquake 2009 was seems fit with the lead-agency typology proposed by Gillmann (2009). 
However, the network itself was under-performed in which contradict with the prediction of the model. In 
this case, the explanation is related to the capacity of the lead-agency itself. While at the beginning 
Satkorlak West Java able to claim its position as the only actor to control access to the disaster-stricken 
zone, later it was proved that it was not enough due to limited capacity and human resource. Moreover, 
without any daily organization in charge of disaster management in West Java, at that time although later 
they formed their own BPBD, and without contingency plan it can be seen that lead-agency type network 
will only be under-performed. Later on, from the analysis, it can be learned that performance and 
coverage of the network got better when external organization to provincial level ensure its existence as 
daily counterpart to Satkorlak West Java, i.e. BNPB and UN-OCHA, in this sense we can conclude that at 
the time of local actor whom in charge has inadequate capacity thus lead-partnership might performs 
better than the lead-agency type network.  
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